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Abstract 
 
Which electorates receive targeted funding, and does targeted funding swing votes? 
To answer these questions, I analyze four discretionary programs funded by the 
Australian federal government during the 2001-2004 election cycle. Controlling for 
relevant demographic characteristics of the electorate, those electorates held by the 
governing coalition received a larger share of discretionary funding, and a larger 
number of program grants. Among government seats, funding does not appear to have 
been directed towards those that were more marginal. More discretionary funding – 
particularly on road-building – was associated with a larger swing towards the 
government in the 2004 election. 
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1. Introduction 
Pork barrel politics – the practice of targeting expenditure to particular 
districts based on political considerations – has been in existence for at least two 
centuries.1 In the United States, where the term is often used, over 15,000 projects per 
year are “earmarked” for particular districts (Flake 2006). Variously sponsored by 
representatives of both major parties, such projects are frequently added onto budget 
appropriations to accommodate constituents, campaign donors, or potential 
supporters.  
While pork-barreling has been extensively studied in the United States, less 
research has been conducted on the phenomenon among parliamentary democracies, 
in which political parties typically exert more control over their legislators. When 
decision-making over local expenditure is more highly centralized, resources may be 
allocated differently than in a decentralized system.  
Here, I focus on four multi-million dollar Australian programs that were 
allocated on a discretionary basis across federal electorates. As a parliamentary 
democracy with compulsory voting, Australia provides a useful testing-ground for 
theories about the partisan allocation of discretionary funding – both between 
government and opposition, and within the governing Liberal-National Coalition. It 
also provides an opportunity to explore the effect of additional spending on voting 
patterns in the subsequent election.  
To preview my findings, I observe a strong partisan component to the 
expenditure decisions, with more generous funding and more program grants 
allocated to electorates held by the party in power. This result is robust to controlling 
for demographic characteristics of the electorate that might have affected the 
allocation of funding. Estimating the effect of this expenditure on voting, I find that 
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targeted funding – particularly roads funding – had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the vote received by the Liberal-National Coalition in the 2004 
election.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews 
the relevant literature. Section 3 outlines the data and institutional context. Section 4 
estimates the extent to which funding decisions appear to have been skewed by 
political considerations. Section 5 estimates the effect of the funding on the results in 
the following election, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Research on Pork-Barreling 
The ability of governments to apportion local-level expenditure for partisan 
purposes has long been of interest to political scientists and economists (for a recent 
review of the literature, see Evans 2004). One set of studies has focused on the 
relationship between electoral systems and pork-barrel politics. For example, 
Lancaster (1986) points out that one should expect more pork-barreling in countries 
with single-member electorates (e.g., Australia, Britain, Canada) than in countries 
with multi-member electorates (e.g., Italy, Israel, the Netherlands). This occurs 
because voters in multi-member systems are unsure which politician to reward for a 
particular piece of pork, which leads to more free-riding among representatives, and 
therefore a lower level of pork-barreling. (In the formulation of Mayhew 2004, “credit 
claiming” is most straightforward when a single member of parliament has 
responsibility for each district.) Another factor that may explain cross-national 
differences in the level of pork-barreling is the potential for clientelism and corruption 
to be mutually reinforcing in countries with weak democratic institutions (Manzetti 
and Wilson 2007). 
 3
Another key question in this literature is whether politicians allocate resources 
primarily towards swing seats or safe seats. While Cox and McCubbins (1986) posited 
a model in which politicians are risk-averse, and therefore channel resources more 
generously towards their core supporters, Dixit and Londregan (1996) argued that in 
certain circumstances, politicians may prefer to spend money on swing voters.  
Several studies have sought to determine whether a greater share of spending 
is directed towards core supporters or swing voters. Programs that seem to be more 
targeted towards core supporters include Canadian regional development grants 
(Milligan and Smart 2005), Italian provincial infrastructure spending (Golden and 
Picci 2007), and New Deal funding in the United States during the 1930s (Lindstädt 
2005). By contrast, those that appear to be more targeted towards swing voters include 
Canadian job training grants (Crampton 2004), French road spending (Cadot et al. 
2002), allocations to Indian states (Arulampalam et al. 2008), and Swedish 
environmental spending (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002).2  
In the Australian context, two studies of a $60 million sports grants program in 
the early 1990s concluded that the spending was directed in a partisan fashion, 
primarily towards swing voters (Gaunt 1999; Denemark 2000). Similarly, an analysis 
of federal programs for the unemployed (Andrews, Fry and Jakee 2005) found that the 
program was skewed towards government-held marginal electorates.  
Within single-member electorate systems, the power of individual members 
relative to political parties has been regarded as important. Theory predicts that in 
systems with weaker political parties and stronger individual members, pork-barreling 
will tend to be directed towards core supporters. By contrast, when parties are 
stronger and individual members weaker, discretionary funding is more likely to be 
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targeted towards electorates with smaller vote margins.3 As Denemark (2000, 898) 
has noted: 
“Unlike the sharp dichotomy between the interests of the individual and the 
party that fuels constituency activities in America, parliamentary parties in 
government confront a collective electoral imperative to assure the victory of 
their most vulnerable party colleagues in marginal seats. In short, the 
parliamentary gap between individual and collective interests is ‘virtually 
nonexistent’ (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984: 111).”4 
With some exceptions (e.g., Milligan and Smart 2005), the empirical literature 
across countries has tended to support this theoretical prediction. 
How much does pork-barreling matter at the ballot box? While some studies 
have observed little or no relationship between local expenditure and voteshare 
(Feldman and Jondrow 1984; Stein and Bickers 1994), others have found that more 
spending raises the voteshare of the incumbent (Alvarez and Saving 1997b; Levitt and 
Snyder 1997). Levitt and Snyder (1997) suggested that if spending levels are higher 
when the incumbent is weak, the coefficient on expenditure might be biased 
downwards, and instrument for local spending using spending in the same state but 
outside the district. I discuss this possible bias in section 5. 
 
3. Data and Institutional Context 
3.1 Background 
Australia is a bicameral parliamentary system. For elections to the House of 
Representatives, which will be the focus of this study, the preferential system of 
voting (also termed instant-runoff) is used. Voters number candidates on the ballot in 
order of preference. Once all votes have been counted, the candidate with the lowest 
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number of votes is eliminated and that candidate’s votes distributed to the remaining 
candidates according to the preference orderings on each ballot paper. This process 
continues until one candidate has more than 50% of the vote.5 The term of office is a 
maximum of three years, and the government has discretion in setting the election 
date. 
Since World War II, the three major political parties in Australia have been the 
Australian Labor Party (a left-wing party closely aligned with the trade union 
movement), the National Party (a right-wing rural party) and the Liberal Party (a 
right-wing party with a more urban base). In the post-war era, the Liberal and 
National Parties have operated in permanent coalition with one another, with the 
exception of two brief breaks in 1973-1974 and 1987. During the period covered by 
this study (2001-2004), the Liberal-National Coalition, led by Prime Minister John 
Howard, held office. This government came to power in 1996 and held office until 
2007, winning elections in 1996, 1998, 2001, and 2004. In the 2001 federal election, 
the Labor Party received 38% of the first preference vote, the Liberal Party 37%, and 
the National Party 6%. In the 2004 federal election, the three parties’ first preference 
vote shares were 38%, 41%, and 6% respectively. Voting is compulsory in Australia, 
and in the 2001 and 2004 elections the fine for failing to vote was A$20, 
approximately equal to the median hourly wage. 
In selecting the programs used in this study, my focus is on Australian federal 
government programs that meet the following criteria: 
(a) they are regional in nature, and allocated in a manner that allowed for some 
discretion by politicians; 
(b) grants were largely announced or delivered between the 10 November 2001 
and 16 October 2004 federal elections; and 
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(c) statistics on the size of the funding are available by electorate.  
Four programs meet these three criteria: Roads to Recovery, Stronger Families 
& Communities, Sustainable Regions, and Regional Partnerships. In sections 3.2 to 
3.5, I discuss each of the programs, focusing on the aims of the programs, the dates 
when the funding was delivered, the funding criteria, the source of the funding data, 
and any publicly available cost-benefit analyses. Section 3.6 outlines the electoral and 
demographic variables. 
 
3.2 Roads to Recovery 
The Roads to Recovery program was announced in November 2000, and 
commenced in January 2001. It provides funding to local councils to undertake “the 
construction, upgrade or maintenance of roads”. Overall, 46% of funding was devoted 
to reconstruction, rehabilitation or widening of existing roads, 26% to sealing or 
resealing, 7% to bridges and tunnels, and 6% to the construction of a new road. The 
remainder of the funding was devoted to smaller programs, including signage, street 
lighting and bicycle paths (Department of Transport and Regional Services and the 
Australian Local Government Association [DOTARS/ALGA] 2003).  
To prevent federal funding merely being substituted for state funding, a 
condition of receipt is that local councils are required to maintain their roads 
expenditure at the same level as in the 1998-99 to 2000-01 financial years. Another 
condition requires that each of the projects be signposted at both ends with a “Roads 
to Recovery” sign, acknowledging the financial assistance of the federal government 
(with each pair of signs costing $550, the total cost of this advertising across more 
than 8000 projects nationwide exceeds $4 million). The allocation mechanism is 
somewhat opaque, but according to the program’s annual report (DOTARS 2004), 
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funding is allocated across states and territories according to “historical precedents, 
length of local roads and population”. The report does not make clear precisely how 
funding is allocated across local areas.  
In this analysis, I focus on $1.1 billion of funding allocated between January 
2001 and June 2005 ($1.2 billion was allocated, but not all projects could be matched 
to a federal electorate). For the most part, this funding was announced and delivered 
during the 2001-04 election cycle. Figures were tabulated according to local councils 
(DOTARS 2004), and were then matched to federal electorates by Davis (2005).6  
In 2003, the federal government commissioned a cost-benefit analysis of the 
programs (DOTARS/ALGA 2003). This covered 80 projects, slightly less than 1% of 
the total number of Roads to Recovery projects funded to that point. Based on data 
provided by councils (most of which failed to supply the requested data), the analysis 
concluded that the average benefit-cost ratio of Roads to Recovery projects was 1.8. 
However, the distribution was highly skewed. While some projects had benefit-cost 
ratios as high as 16, most were much lower. 55% of projects had a benefit-cost ratio 
below one, so for the median Roads to Recovery program, the costs outweighed the 
benefits. Only 20% of programs had a benefit-cost ratio exceeding two. By contrast, 
the National Black Spot program, which also operated over this period, refused to 
consider applications for any programs whose benefit-cost ratio was lower than two 
(DOTARS 2001a: Part 2.1).7  
 
3.3 Stronger Families & Communities 
The Stronger Families & Communities Strategy commenced in April 2000. 
The strategy comprised four initiatives: (i) Communities for Children; (ii) Invest to 
Grow–Established and Developing Programs; (iii) Local Answers; and (iv) Choice 
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and Flexibility in Child Care. Here, I focus on Volunteer Small Equipment Grants 
delivered under the “Local Answers” program in the financial year 2004-05. Although 
the 2004 federal election was held early in the financial year, these grants typically 
were announced or delivered prior to the election. 
The aim of the Local Answers program was to supports projects that: “build 
effective parenting and relationships skills; build opportunities and skills for 
economic self reliance in families and communities; strengthen support to families 
and communities by delivering better services and addressing unmet needs through 
the building of partnerships between local services; assist young parents in particular 
to further their education or access to training and other services where they are 
seeking to make the transition to employment; assist members of the community to 
get involved in community life through local volunteering or mentoring of young 
people or training to build community leadership and initiative.” (Department of 
Family and Community Services [FaCS] 2005a). So far as I am aware, no cost-benefit 
analysis of the Local Answers program was conducted.8 
Volunteer Small Equipment Grants were grants to “encourage and support 
volunteers by enabling local community organisations to purchase small equipment 
items to make the work of their volunteers easier, safer and more enjoyable” (FaCS 
2005a). The funding data, tabulated by electorate, were provided by FaCS in response 
to a question on notice by Senator Chris Evans.9 It covered 1206 grants, ranging in 
value from $59 to $4545.10 For example, grants included $2200 to the Apex Club of 
Bairnsdale, $1833 to the Munglinup Pony Club, $2932 to the Ryde Regional Radio 
Cooperative, and $1204 to the Blackburn Community Church of Christ. Nationally, 
the grants amounted to $2.5 million, only a small fraction of the total expenditure on 
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the Stronger Families & Communities strategy. These grant-level figures are then 
collapsed to electorate level.  
 
3.4 Sustainable Regions 
The Sustainable Regions program was announced on 29 August 2001, and was 
aimed at assisting regions facing major economic, social or environmental change. 
Initially, eight regions were selected, and each was allocated a maximum amount, to 
be spent between 2001 and 2006. The regions selected and the maximum amounts 
allocated were: the Atherton Tablelands, Queensland ($18 million); Wide Bay 
Burnett, Queensland ($8 million); Campbelltown-Camden, New South Wales ($12 
million); Far North East New South Wales ($12 million); Cradle Coast, Tasmania 
($12 million); Gippsland, Victoria ($12 million); Kimberley, Western Australia ($12 
million); and Playford/Salisbury, South Australia ($12 million). In 2004, two 
additional regions were selected, to receive funding over the period 2004-2008. These 
were Northern Rivers and North Coast, New South Wales ($12 million); and Western 
Queensland and Western New South Wales ($21 million). These regions in turn 
allocate funding to specific local programs, focusing on particular regional priorities. 
Common priority areas include creating jobs, attracting new industries, attracting 
more young people to the area, and boosting tourism.  
According to the government department responsible, a variety of 
considerations were taken in account in selecting the regions: 
“Regions (including urban fringe areas as well as those outside capital cities) 
were identified against criteria that included remoteness as well as important 
socio-economic and demographic indicators, such as levels of unemployment, 
family income and structural change indices, amongst others. Importantly, 
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each of the eight regions selected initially demonstrated a strong degree of 
initiative, self-reliance and commitment to community action.” (quoted in 
Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee [SFPAC] 2005: para 
9.7) 
Ultimately, however, final decisions on the program were the responsibility of 
the minister. As the guidelines stated: 
“The Sustainable Regions Programme is a discretionary grants programme. 
The funding of projects is at the discretion of the Minister for Transport and 
Regional Services. Therefore, meeting the assessment criteria and addressing 
one or more regional priorities does not guarantee funding.” (quoted in 
SFPAC 2005: para 9.12) 
A Senate Report on the program concluded that “The Committee has been 
unable to discover the process by which sustainable regions were selected by the 
minister.” (SFPAC 2005: para 9.7). So far as I am aware, no cost-benefit analysis of 
the Sustainable Regions program has been conducted. 
In this paper, I analyze electorate-level tabulations provided by the 
Department of Transport and Regional Services to the Senate Finance and Public 
Administration Committee. These tabulations cover individual programs funded under 
the Sustainable Regions program. For example, projects include $550,000 given to the 
North Coast Plywood Products Pty Ltd (New South Wales) to build new age plywood 
preservative treatment facilities; $950,000 given to Burra Foods Pty Ltd (Victoria) to 
build a cheese Plant; $15,000 to the River of Gold Slate Mine Pty Ltd (Queensland) to 
develop a marketing plan, and $1.1 million to the City of Salisbury (South Australia) 
for the Wyatt Road Redevelopment Project. Projects were approved between April 
2002 and December 2004. The data cover 192 projects, totaling $136 million. Of this, 
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$64 million (181 projects) was spent on projects within a single federal electorate, 
while the remainder went to projects that were split across multiple federal 
electorates. In this analysis, I use only the $64 million that can be allocated to a single 
federal electorate, though the results shown below are similar if the split funding is 
used instead. 
 
3.5 Regional Partnerships 
The Regional Partnerships program, which commenced on 1 July 2003, was 
aimed at giving effect to the principles set out in the Coalition government’s statement 
Stronger Regions, A Stronger Australia (DOTARS 2001b). The statement set out 
broad goals for regional assistance, emphasizing the desirability of different tiers of 
government working together, increasing the economic diversity of regional areas, 
and communities themselves identifying the programs they wished to fund. 
The Regional Partnerships program replaced eight precursor programs (the 
Regional Solutions, Regional Assistance, Rural Transaction Centres, and Dairy 
Regional Assistance programs,  plus four regional structural adjustment 
programs). Between 1 July 2003 and 31 December 2004, $124 million of expenditure 
was approved under the program (SFPAC 2005: para 2.39). The programs are 
administered by regional bodies known as Area Consultative Committees (ACCs 
were first established in 1995; there are 56 in Australia). 
Similarly to the Sustainable Regions program, the guidelines for the Regional 
Partnerships program explicitly stated that: 
“Regional Partnerships is a discretionary programme. The funding of projects, 
through Regional Partnerships, is at the discretion of the Federal Minister for 
Transport and Regional Services or the Federal Minister for Regional 
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Services, Territories and Local Government, therefore meeting the assessment 
criteria does not guarantee funding.” (quoted in SFPAC 2005: para 2.32) 
Among the programs funded were $250,000 to develop a complex in 
Georgetown, Tasmania to house the Bass and Flinders replica ship; $550,000 for the 
Slim Dusty Foundation Ltd in Kempsey (NSW); $1.5 million for dredging work at the 
mouth of Tumbi Creek (NSW); and $12.7 million for transitional support to the sugar 
industry. A Senate Committee raised questions about the high proportion of 
applications that were approved immediately prior to the 2004 federal election. So far 
as I am aware, no cost-benefit analysis of the Regional Partnerships program has been 
conducted. 
In this paper, I analyze electorate-level tabulations provided by the 
Department of Transport and Regional Services to the Senate Finance and Public 
Administration Committee. These tabulations cover 511 projects, amounting to $111 
million of the total $124 million allocated between July 2003 and December 2004. 
 
3.6 Electoral and Demographic Variables 
In both the 2001 and 2004 elections, there were 150 seats in the House of 
Representatives. However, as a result of redistributions that occurred in Queensland, 
South Australia and Victoria, two seats were abolished (Bonython, SA and Burke, 
Vic), and two new seats were created (Bonner, Qld and Gorton, Vic). Further 
complicating matters, data on the Roads to Recovery program are tabulated according 
to 2004 electorates, while data on the Stronger Families & Communities, Sustainable 
Regions and Regional Partnerships programs are tabulated according to 2001 
electorates. 
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For the purposes of analyzing Roads to Recovery expenditure (Section 4), I 
use the share of the vote received by the Coalition in 2001.11 For this purpose, it is 
necessary to impute voteshare to those seats that did not exist at the 2001 election. 
This is done using predictions from election analyst Antony Green, estimated prior to 
the 2004 election based on booth-level data from the 2001 election.12 Since the booth-
level data suggest that Labor would have won both seats in 2001, both are classified 
as Labor seats. The actual composition of the 150-seat parliament following the 2001 
election was 69 Liberal, 13 National, 63 Labor, 3 Independent, 1 Green, and 1 
Country Liberal. For the purpose of this analysis, the Country Liberal Party seat is 
coded as a National Party seat. 
When estimating the effect that targeted funding had on election outcomes 
(Section 5), I calculate the “swing” towards or away from the Coalition in each 
electorate. For this purpose, it is desirable to measure the swing not by comparing the 
actual 2001 and 2004 results, but instead by using the booth-level results from 2001 to 
calculate what the election result would have been if the 2001 election had been held 
on the 2004 boundaries, and then comparing this to the actual 2004 election result.13 
The variable Swing is therefore the percentage point difference between the 
Coalition’s share of the two-party vote in the 2001 election (on 2004 boundaries) and 
the Coalition’s share of the two-party vote in the 2004 election.14 On average, the 
Coalition received a 2 percentage point swing in its favor. At an electorate level, the 
swing towards the Coalition varied from -12 percentage points (i.e., a 12 percentage 
point swing towards the Labor Party) to +22 percentage points. 
Demographic variables are included to take into account possible 
characteristics of the seat that might have directly influenced the allocation of 
funding.15 The variables selected are the population density (square kilometers per 
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person), and the median family income (in thousands of dollars). Demographic 
characteristics are from Kopras (2003), based on the 2001 Census and 2001 electoral 
boundaries.16 
Table 1 presents summary statistics. The variables Liberal Party Seat and 
National Party Seat denote respectively whether the seat was won by one of the two 
governing parties in 2001. 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
 
4. An Empirical Analysis of the Distribution of Funding  
4.1 Quantum of Funding 
To see the relationship between political considerations and funding decisions, 
Figure 1 charts the percentage of the two-party preferred vote received by the 
Coalition at the 2001 election against the amount of funding received under each of 
the programs. All four programs were more generous to Coalition-held seats (those to 
the right of the dashed line) than to those held by the non-government parties (those to 
the left of the dashed line). Among Coalition-held seats, it does not appear that more 
funding was devoted to marginal seats than safe seats. 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
To formally test whether the allocation of funding was affected by partisan 
factors, I regress the amount of funding assigned to each seat on indicator variables 
denoting whether the seat was held by the National Party or the Liberal Party in 2001. 
Table 2, Panel A shows the results from this exercise. The largest partisan effects are 
observed for Roads to Recovery and Stronger Families & Communities. In the case of 
Roads to Recovery, an average of $14.9 million more funding was allocated to each 
National Party seat, while $2.9 million more funding was allocated to each Liberal 
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Party seat (both significant at the 5% level or better). Stronger Families & 
Communities allocations were also more generous to National Party Seats (an 
additional $0.02 million) and to Liberal Party seats (an additional $0.007 million), a 
result that is significant at the 1% level. More funding was received by National Party 
seats under the Sustainable Regions program (an additional $1.7 million) and the 
Regional Partnerships program (an additional $1.5 million). These two results are 
statistically significant only at the 10% level.  
In Panel B, I control for the demographic characteristics of the electorates that 
might be associated with the allocation of funding. Specifically, I include a quadratic 
in population density for the Roads to Recovery, Sustainable Regions and Regional 
Partnerships programs, and a quadratic in income for the Stronger Families & 
Communities grants. With these controls, the allocations to the National Party and the 
Liberal Party remain statistically significant for the Roads to Recovery program, 
although the magnitude of the coefficients falls to +$6.8 million for National Party 
electorates, and +$2.7 million for Liberal Party electorates. The population density 
controls confirm that the program was indeed more generous towards less densely 
populated electorates.  
For the Stronger Families & Communities program, including income controls 
has little impact on the magnitude or statistical significance of the partisan 
coefficients. The income controls indicate that slightly more funding was provided to 
poorer seats. 
Controlling for population density, allocations to the Sustainable Regions and 
Regional Partnerships do not have a statistically significant partisan bias. The 
population density coefficient is statistically significant for the Regional Partnerships 
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program. For the Sustainable Regions program, the population density coefficients are 
not statistically significant. 
One point to note about all of the results above is that in all specifications in 
Panels A and B, the National Party coefficients are larger in magnitude than the 
Liberal Party coefficients. Since the National Party are the junior party in the federal 
Coalition, this is somewhat surprising, and suggests that the party’s influence in 
obtaining targeted funding was disproportionate to its representation in the 
government.  
<<Table 2 about here>> 
 
4.2 Number of Grants 
I now turn to looking at the relationship between partisanship and the number 
of grants delivered. The intuition for this approach is that, with quasi-rational voters, a 
politician may gain more political capital from being able to announce a larger 
number of grants. Alternatively, more grants may allow a politician to target a larger 
number of interest groups within the electorate. Either scenario suggests the 
possibility that a politician may gain more political advantage from announcing ten 
separate grants of $50,000 than a single $500,000 grant. Since I do not have data on 
the number of Roads to Recovery programs per electorate, I focus in this section only 
on the other three programs. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the number of grants per electorate, including a 
control for demographic characteristics. Compared with non-government seats, 
National Party electorates tend to have an additional 5.2 Stronger Families & 
Communities grants, and an additional 3.4 Regional Partnerships grants. Liberal Party 
electorates have an additional 4.3 Stronger Families & Communities grants, and an 
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additional 1.7 Regional Partnerships grants. There are no significant differences in the 
number of Sustainable Regions grants allocated to either National Party or Liberal 
Party electorates. 
In Panel B of Table 3, I add a control for the total amount of funding (in effect 
now testing whether the funding in government electorates is delivered in smaller 
parcels than in non-government electorates).17 For the most part, the results are 
qualitatively similar to those in Panel A. Controlling for total funding, Liberal Party 
electorates receive a larger number of Stronger Families & Communities grants and 
Regional Partnerships grants. Controlling for total funding, National Party electorates 
receive a larger number of Regional Partnerships grants, but a smaller number of 
Stronger Families & Communities grants.  
<<Table 3 about here>> 
 
4.3 Swing Seats or Base? 
An important question in the existing literature is whether targeted funding 
tends to be delivered more towards swing seats or safe seats. To test this, I restrict the 
analysis to Coalition seats, and regress the amount of funding on the Coalition’s share 
of the vote in the 2001 election.18 The results are presented in Table 4. I find some 
evidence that Roads to Recovery funding was targeted towards safer seats (significant 
at the 5% level), and some evidence that Sustainable Regions funding was targeted 
towards more marginal seats (significant at the 10% level). However, the magnitude 
of both coefficients is quite small. When the dependent variable is the number of 
grants instead of the total funding allocation, I find no significant relationship between 
grants and the Coalition’s share of the vote in Coalition-held seats.  
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Note that while the results in Table 4 do not show any strong patterns 
according to whether seats were safe or marginal, it would not be correct to say that 
funding was spread evenly across Coalition seats. As the results in Tables 2 and 3 
demonstrated, seats held by the National Party, the junior partner in the Coalition, 
received significantly more funding than those held by the Liberal Party.19 
<<Table 4 about here>> 
 
5. An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Funding on Elections 
How do voters respond at the ballot box to targeted funding? To test this, I 
analyze the relationship between additional funding provided through the programs 
analysed above and the vote received by the Coalition in the 2004 election. However, 
as has been noted by others, it is possible that the relationship between funding and 
voting is biased by omitted variables. The direction of this bias is in principle unclear. 
For example, the quality of the Coalition candidate and targeted funding could be 
negatively correlated (e.g., if funding is centrally allocated, the government might 
devote more resources to electorates where their candidate is of low quality). 
Alternatively, Coalition candidate quality might be positively correlated with funding 
(e.g., if the main determinant of funding is the perseverance of the local Coalition 
member of parliament).  
To address this problem, I focus not on the share of the vote received by the 
Coalition candidate in the 2004 election, but on the swing towards the Coalition. 
Since the Coalition candidate in most electorates was the same in 2001 and 2004, the 
swing is more likely to reflect factors that have changed between the two elections. 
Unobserved factors (such as the quality of the Coalition candidate) are assumed to 
have affected the Coalition’s voteshare equally in both elections. Note that it is not 
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necessary to first-difference the funding variable, since the four programs analyzed in 
this paper dispensed little or no money prior to the 2001 election. 
Table 5 presents the results from regressing the swing towards the Coalition 
on the amount of targeted funding. The coefficient on the Roads to Recovery program 
is 0.25, indicating that a $1 million increase in funding raised the Coalition’s share of 
the vote by 0.25 percentage points. Since the standard deviation on Roads to Recovery 
funding is 9.7, a one standard deviation increase in Roads to Recovery funding 
boosted the Coalition’s voteshare by 2.4 percentage points. The coefficient on the 
Stronger Families & Communities program is substantially larger, at 117.7. However, 
the standard deviation of Stronger Families & Communities funding is much smaller. 
A one standard deviation increase in Stronger Families & Communities funding 
($0.016 million) boosted the Coalition’s voteshare by 1.9 percentage points.20 The 
coefficients on the Sustainable Regions and Regional Partnerships programs are not 
statistically significant. 
One possibility is that the swing to the Coalition between 2001 and 2004 was 
driven by factors that were also correlated with both funding allocations. To test this, 
Panel B includes controls for population density (for Roads to Recovery, Sustainable 
Regions, and Regional Partnerships), and for income (for Stronger Families & 
Communities). This has the effect of increasing the size of the Roads to Recovery 
coefficient substantially, and reducing the Stronger Families & Communities 
coefficient very slightly. Both remain statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Next, I include a control for the share of the vote received by the Coalition in 
2001. As the results in Table 4 showed, more Roads to Recovery funding was 
provided to safe Coalition seats than marginal Coalition seats. It is also possible that 
the Coalition’s swing from the 2001 to 2004 election was positively correlated with its 
 20
voteshare in 2001 (for example, government parliamentarians might have been more 
successful than opposition representatives at exploiting the resources of incumbency). 
If this were the case, then the relationship between funding and the swing might be 
spurious.  
Such an approach could be over-cautious – for example, if one of the channels 
through which Coalition incumbents were particularly successful was through 
obtaining targeted funding. In Panel C, I include a control for the Coalition’s 
voteshare in 2001. This has the effect of reducing the coefficients on Roads to 
Recovery and Stronger Families & Communities to about one-third to one-quarter of 
their magnitude in Panel A. Both are still significant at the 5% level. In Panel D, I 
include controls for both demographics and voteshare. In this specification, Roads to 
Recovery expenditure is positively correlated with the swing towards the Coalition. 
The other three programs are no longer statistically significant. 
<<Table 5 about here>> 
Since allocations of funding under these four programs might be positively 
correlated with one another, Table 6 presents results with all four programs included 
together. In the first column, I find that without any other controls, the coefficient on 
the Roads to Recovery program is positive (and significant at the 1% level), while 
Stronger Families & Communities is positive (and significant at the 10% level). 
Regional Partnerships funding is, surprisingly, negative (and significant at the 10% 
level). Since the coefficient on the Regional Partnerships program was insignificant in 
Table 5, it would be unwise to make much of this result.  
Controlling for demographics and the Coalition’s share of the vote in 2001, it 
is notable that the magnitude of the Roads to Recovery coefficient is very similar to 
that in Table 5. By contrast, the coefficient on the Stronger Families & Communities 
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program is statistically insignificant in columns (2), (3) and (4). The coefficient on the 
Regional Partnerships program is statistically insignificant with only demographic 
controls (column 2), but negative and significant in columns (3) and (4).  
<<Table 6 about here>> 
Do electorates that receive a larger number of grants have a larger swing 
towards the Coalition? In Table 7, I show the relationship between the swing towards 
the Coalition and the number of grants, focusing on the three programs for which data 
are available. In Panel A (with no other controls), I find that an extra Stronger 
Families & Communities grant raised voteshare by 0.25 percentage points, while an 
additional Regional Partnerships grant raised voteshare by 0.4 percentage points (both 
significant at the 1% level). These two results are still statistically significant when 
controlling for either electorate demographics (Panel B) or the Coalition’s voteshare 
in 2001 (Panel C). However, when controls for both electorate demographics and 
Coalition voteshare in 2001 are included (Panel D), only the number of Regional 
Partnerships grants remains statistically significant (at the 10% level).  
Note, however, that including a control for 2001 voteshare may be 
“overcontrolling”. Assuming this to be the case, the results in Table 7 suggest that the 
number of grants does matter at the ballot box. So far as I am aware, this paper is the 
first to document an effect of the number of grants delivered on the vote. This 
suggests that future analyses of pork-barreling should take into account not only the 
quantum of funding, but also the number of grants that are delivered to each 
constituency. 
<<Table 7 about here>> 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper analyses the distribution of regional assistance programs across 
Australian federal electorates. Such an approach has its limitations – while these 
programs amounted to over a billion dollars of expenditure, this sum was only a small 
fraction of total federal government spending. Moreover, regional assistance programs 
are only one possible way that governments can direct resources towards particular 
electorates. Decisions over the location of universities, hospitals, military bases, and 
government offices can all be implemented in a partisan manner. 
Yet regional assistance programs do account for a large (and in some cases, 
growing) share of government budgets. Spending on regional assistance amounts to 
over US$16 billion in the United States, more than €30 billion in the European Union, 
and over $4 billion in Australia. In allocating these resources, there is therefore 
considerable potential for political considerations to take precedence over social and 
economic factors.21 
The distribution of funding under the four programs analyzed in this paper 
appears to have been strongly skewed towards electorates that were held by the 
Coalition government in 2001. Compared with non-government seats, and controlling 
for relevant demographic characteristics, seats held by the National Party received on 
average $6.8 million more under the Roads to Recovery program and $15,000 more 
under Stronger Families & Communities program. Liberal Party seats received $2.7 
million more under the Roads to Recovery program, and $8000 more under the 
Stronger Families & Communities program. As well as receiving more money, the 
number of grants also was higher in Coalition seats. National Party electorates 
received an additional 5.2 Stronger Families & Communities grants, and an additional 
3.4 Regional Partnerships grants. Liberal Party electorates received an additional 4.3 
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Stronger Families & Communities grants, and an additional 1.7 Regional Partnerships 
grants.22  
I find little evidence that the grants were more generous to more marginal 
electorates (indeed, if anything, more of the Roads to Recovery program seems to 
have gone to safe seats). To the extent that funding was allocated disproportionately 
to Coalition seats, it appears to have been targeted towards seats held by the smaller 
party in the Coalition, the National Party, and not towards swing seats. This is 
surprising in light of the fact that earlier studies of pork-barreling in Australia have 
found the funding to be more generously targeted towards marginal electorates (Gaunt 
1999 and Denemark 2000 for sports grants in the early 1990s; Andrews, Fry and 
Jakee 2005 for unemployment programs in the late 1990s).  
Although this study is not the first to observe targeted assistance in a 
parliamentary system which is not targeted at swing seats (Milligan and Smart 2005 
saw a similar pattern for Canadian regional development grants), such a finding 
differs from the usual predictions of a model in which pork-barreling in parliamentary 
systems tends to focus on swing seats. One possible explanation is that during 
Australia’s 2001-2004 election cycle, the government was always confident of 
winning reelection. Leigh and Wolfers (2006) show that the betting market – an 
accurate prediction of election outcomes – had the government as favorites from when 
it opened in July 2003 until polling day in October 2004. Similarly, macroeconomic 
models of election forecasting (based on variables such as unemployment and 
inflation), suggested that the Coalition would win comfortably. Another possibility is 
that the government was more concerned about assuaging internal tensions among the 
Coalition parties by providing largesse to National Party electorates than about 
increasing its parliamentary majority.23 
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Analyzing the effect of the programs on the swing towards the Coalition in the 
2004 election, I find robust evidence that additional funding increased the swing 
towards the Coalition government, and suggestive evidence that a larger number of 
grants delivered to an electorate also helped the government. In terms of the amount 
of funding delivered, the most robust results are for the Roads to Recovery program. 
For every additional $1 million in Roads to Recovery funding, the Coalition increased 
its voteshare by between 0.06 and 0.37 percentage points, depending on the controls 
included in the regression. Since the average number of votes cast per electorate in 
2004 was 82,367, this suggests that each additional vote obtained through the Roads 
to Recovery program cost between $20,234 and $3281.24 This figure is similar to 
Levitt and Snyder (1997), whose estimates of the relationship between federal funding 
and voting suggest that each additional US vote costs around US$14,000 
(approximately $22,000 in 2004 Australian dollars).  
Economists and political scientists in parliamentary democracies have 
traditionally been less concerned about the issue of pork-barreling than their United 
States counterparts. These results suggest that outside the United States, more 
attention should be given to considering the role that partisanship plays in funding 
decisions, and the role of targeted funding in shaping election outcomes. Pork-
barreling is inequitable, potentially inefficient, and may have other social costs, such 
as reducing the level of turnover among politicians below the social optimum.25 
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Notes 
 
1 Gordon (1993) argues that the construction of the Egyptian pyramids was a form of 
pork-barreling, designed to keep peasants from rebelling. A more settled example is 
the US Bonus Bill (1817), a highway project introduced by then Congressman John 
Calhoun, but ultimately vetoed by President Madison. The Oxford English Dictionary 
dates the first use of the term “pork barrel” to an article written in the Westminster 
Gazette in 1909.  
2 Other studies have looked at the manner in which committee memberships affect the 
distribution of pork-barreling in the United States (e.g., Alvarez and Saving 1997a; 
Stein and Bickers 1995). 
3 An additional factor in Australia is the existence of compulsory voting, which 
substantially reduces the risk that the governing party’s core supporters will refuse to 
vote.  
4 The word “virtually” is important here. Even in the strict party discipline of the 
British system, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina note that candidates have an incentive to 
build their personal vote. 
5 The Australian Senate is elected through the single-transferrable vote system. At an 
ordinary election, there are six vacant Senate positions from each of the six states, and 
two from each of the two territories. 
 
 
6 In a 10 March 2008 email to me, Davis stated that “The Roads to Recovery figures 
were reported on a Local Government Area basis because the money goes straight to 
local councils. I converted those figures firstly to statistical local areas and then from 
SLAs [Statistical Local Areas] to federal electorates, allocating the LGA [Local 
Government Area] spending amounts according to population distributions.” Davis 
did not tabulate figures for the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern 
Territory (NT), each of which were allocated $20 million. In the absence of further 
detailed breakdowns, I assume that the seats of Canberra (ACT), Fraser (ACT), 
Lingiari (NT) and Solomon (NT) each received $10 million. 
7 Using the same methodology as Davis (see previous footnote), I summed the 
estimates in the DOTARS/ALGA cost-benefit report to a federal electorate level, and 
tested whether there was any relationship between the benefit/cost ratio and the 
political party that held the seat at the 2001 election. I found no statistically significant 
relationship, but in any case, it should be borne in mind that these projects were 
probably not a random sample of all Roads to Recovery projects. 
8 The 2000-04 evaluation of the Stronger Families & Communities strategy was 
primarily qualitative in nature. A summary of the evaluation stated: “The key 
evaluation questions for Local Answers are: to what extent were aims and outcomes 
achieved? what were the success factors? what were the unintended project outcomes 
and how well were they addressed?” (FaCS 2005b). 
9 Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee, Answers to Estimates Questions 
on Notice, Family and Community Services Portfolio, 2004-05 Supplementary Budget 
Estimates - December 2004, Stronger Families & Communities Strategy Question 
31(k), Attachment A (provided in February 2005). 
 
 
10 Although FaCS (2005) stated that the grants were to be for amounts “up to $3000”, 
one-quarter of the grants in the electoral breakdown were for amounts larger than 
$3000. 
11 Throughout this paper, references to the Coalition include the Liberal Party, the 
National Party, and the Northern Territory Country Liberal Party. 
12 Available at www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2004/. For the seats of Calare, 
Cunningham, Kennedy and New England, Antony Green’s two-party preferred 
estimates are not based on the two major parties. For these seats, I therefore use the 
actual 2001 two-party preferred vote instead. 
13 For the two seats that were eliminated in 2003, the 2004 vote was calculated as the 
average of the main seats into which the former 2001 seat was absorbed. Thus the 
hypothetical 2004 vote for Bonython was calculated as 46.2%, being the average of 
the two-party preferred vote in Makin, Port Adelaide and Wakefield, while the 
hypothetical 2004 vote for Burke was calculated as 44.2%, being the average of the 
two-party preferred vote for Gorton, Lalor and McEwen. 
14 In calculating the swing in this manner, I assume that the redistribution was 
exogenous with respect to funding allocations. This is likely to be a reasonable 
assumption, since the final decision on the new redistribution is made by the 
independent Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), giving regard primarily to 
population trends and natural boundaries between communities. Although the parties 
had an opportunity to make submissions to the AEC, such submissions are much more 
likely to have focused on the underlying demographics than on targeted funding 
decisions. 
 
 
15 There is a certain degree of judgment involved in the selection of the appropriate 
control variables. In testing for a partisan skew in the allocation process, it is 
important to control for variables that directly affect funding decisions 
(“confounders”). However, one should not include variables that affect funding 
decisions only through their impact on the Coalition’s vote share (“partisan proxies”), 
since this will lead to an underestimate of the true partisan effect. For example, the 
regional grant regressions control for population density, since this is a potential 
confounder, in the sense that it may conceivably have had a direct impact on the 
allocation decision. By contrast, it would be a mistake to control for the share of the 
population who grew up in Coalition-voting households, since this variable is more 
likely to be a partisan proxy – affecting the allocation of discretionary funding only 
via its impact on the political complexion of the electorate. A more difficult case is 
the proportion of people in an electorate who were born overseas. None of the four 
funding programs took any explicit account of the share of overseas-born persons 
living in an electorate (nor am I aware of any suggestions that this was implicitly 
considered). However, overseas-born voters are known to be much less likely to vote 
for the Coalition than native-born voters (see e.g., Leigh 2005a). Consequently, I 
regard the overseas-born share as more likely to be a partisan proxy than a 
confounder, and do not control for it in the regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3. If 
the overseas-born share is included, the partisan variables remain statistically 
significant, but the coefficients are smaller in magnitude. 
16 For the two electorates that were created in the 2003 redistribution, the density and 
income variables take the mean of the main electorates covering that area in the 2001 
 
 
election. Thus Bonner is the average for Bowman and Griffith, while Gorton is the 
average for Burke, Calwell and Maribyrnong.  
17 This specification is presented since it is easily comparable with the results in Panel 
A of Table 3. Results are similar if the dependent variable is the average grant size. 
18 Non-government seats are excluded from this analysis on the basis that it is not 
clear whether targeted funding in non-government electorates would have led voters 
to reward the sitting member or the governing party. Assuming that voters always 
reward the governing party for targeted funding, the appropriate way to conduct the 
analysis would be to include all seats, and then regress the funding allocation for each 
program (or the number of grants) on |Coalition Voteshare-50%|. Such an exercise 
produces results that are qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 4. 
19 This result is consistent with the results of Tham and Grove (2004) for political 
donations. They found that between 1999-2000 and 2001-02, the National Party 
received considerably more private donations per vote ($28.64) than the Liberal Party 
($18.62), Labor Party ($22.14), the Australian Democrats ($6.12) or the Greens 
($8.51). 
20 As one reader of an earlier draft pointed out, this coefficient suggests that $1 
million allocated through the Stronger Families & Communities program would 
guarantee the Coalition 100% of the vote. However, such a calculation extrapolates 
far outside the available data, since no electorate received more than $100,000 of 
Stronger Families & Communities funding. Were funding through this program to be 
substantially increased, the marginal electoral effect of additional Stronger Families & 
Communities funding may well decline.     
 
 
21 United States and European Union figures are taken from Milligan and Smart 
(2005). Australia figure is the sum of expenditure on agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
transport and communication. While this may include some expenditure that is not 
regionally directed, it also does not include expenditure in other portfolio areas (e.g., 
recreation and culture, tourism promotion, community assistance) that is regionally 
directed. 
22 In general, the roads-funding and community grants programs (Roads to Recovery 
and Stronger Families & Communities) seem to be allocated in a more partisan 
manner and to have a stronger effect on the vote than the two industry assistance 
programs (Sustainable Regions and Regional Partnerships). One possible explanation 
arises from the fact that the former pair of programs had more grants per electorate (as 
Table 1 shows, there were an average of eight grants per electorate for both Roads to 
Recovery and Stronger Families & Communities, but one for Sustainable Regions and 
three for Regional Partnerships). This might have limited the potential for a strong 
partisan bias in the allocation process, since the smaller numbers would have made 
partisanship more readily apparent to outside observers. Another possibility is that 
industry assistance is less salient or less visible to voters than community 
development and road-building expenditure. If true, this might help to explain why 
industry assistance did less to swing the vote than the other two programs. 
23 One source of this tension is the fact that the National Party’s vote share has been 
steadily declining over recent decades, partly as a result of the diminishing share of 
the Australian population working in farm employment (Brett 2007). For more 
discussion of these tensions, see Warhurst (2007) and Economist Intelligence Unit 
 
 
(2007). The extensive literature on coalition government is surveyed in Diermeier 
(2006). 
24 In an opinion piece, I reported this figure as $28,000 (Leigh 2005b). That regression 
differed from those reported here in two respects: it excluded Roads to Recovery 
funding to the territories; and it was based on swing data comparing the actual 2001 
result with the 2004 result. Here, I include funding allocations to the four territory 
seats, and calculate the swing by comparing the 2001 result (translated onto 2004 
electoral boundaries) with the 2004 result. 
25 In the 2004 Australian election, the incumbent reelection rate was 92% (130/141 
incumbents seeking reelection were successful: Jackman 2005), which was lower than 
in the 2004 US congressional elections, where the incumbent reelection rate was 99% 
(399/401). In the 2001 Australian federal election, the reelection rate was 96% 
(130/135), while in the 1998 election, it was 85% (109/129). 
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Figure 1: Seat margin and amount of targeted funding received
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Table 1: Summary statistics      
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Roads to Recovery ($m) 150 7.845 9.712 1.691 59.642
Stronger Families ($m) 150 0.016 0.016 0.000 0.097
Stronger Families (# of projects) 150 7.973 7.595 0.000 49.000
Sustainable Regions ($m) 150 0.428 1.811 0.000 12.928
Sustainable Regions (# of projects) 150 1.207 5.141 0.000 44.000
Regional Partnerships ($m) 150 0.736 1.641 0.000 12.145
Regional Partnerships (# of projects) 150 3.353 5.012 0.000 33.000
National Party seat (2001) 152 0.092 0.290 0.000 1.000
Liberal Party seat (2001) 152 0.454 0.500 0.000 1.000
Coalition share of 2PP vote (2001) 152 50.763 10.862 24.920 73.930
Swing (2004 minus 2001) 152 2.206 5.986 -11.950 21.510
Population density (km2 per person) 152 0.353 1.484 0.000 10.000
Median weekly family income 
($000s) 152 0.970 0.242 0.618 1.792
Note: Between the 2001 and 2004 elections, two seats were abolished and two new seats were created. 
Since Roads to Recovery funding is tabulated on 2004 electoral boundaries, and the other three programs 
are tabulated on the 2001 electoral boundaries, the summary statistics cover 152 seats. All regression 
results, however, cover either 150 seats (if focusing on a single program), or 148 seats (if focusing on 
multiple programs). 
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Table 2: Partisanship and funding allocation  
Dependent variable: Total funding per electorate ($m) 
Panel A: Without demographic controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 R2R SF&C SR RP 
National Party 14.904*** 0.021*** 1.684* 1.501* 
 [4.084] [0.005] [0.958] [0.833] 
Liberal Party 2.902** 0.007*** -0.001 0.192 
 [1.346] [0.002] [0.249] [0.234] 
Observations 150 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.07 
Panel B: With demographic controls 
National Party 6.767*** 0.015*** 1.345 0.71 
 [2.152] [0.005] [1.197] [1.051] 
Liberal Party 2.699*** 0.008*** -0.035 0.142 
 [0.928] [0.002] [0.211] [0.141] 
Income  -0.072**   
  [0.030]   
Income2  0.022*   
  [0.012]   
Population Density 17.704***  0.711 1.692** 
 [3.320]  [1.200] [0.813] 
Population Density2 -1.558***  -0.041 -0.123 
 [0.359]  [0.125] [0.080] 
Observations 150 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.70 0.26 0.15 0.37 
Note: R2R=Roads to Recovery, SF&C=Stronger Families & Communities, SR=Sustainable Regions, 
RP=Regional Partnerships. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Population density is square kilometers per person. Income is 
median weekly family income ($000s).  
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Table 3: Partisanship and number of grants 
Dependent variable: Number of grants per electorate 
Panel A    
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SF&C SR RP 
National Party 5.195*** 4.852 3.355** 
 [1.907] [3.946] [1.311] 
Liberal Party 4.338*** -0.214 1.740*** 
 [1.221] [0.487] [0.583] 
Demographic 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.25 0.16 0.46 
Panel B    
National Party -1.631** 1.254 2.465* 
 [0.760] [0.853] [1.482] 
Liberal Party 0.713** -0.119 1.562*** 
 [0.315] [0.215] [0.512] 
Total funding ($m) 467.050*** 2.675*** 1.255** 
 [18.401] [0.307] [0.608] 
Demographic 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.93 0.91 0.56 
Note: SF&C=Stronger Families & Communities, SR=Sustainable Regions, RP=Regional Partnerships. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Demographic controls are a quadratic in median family income for SF&C, and a 
quadratic in population density for SR and RP. 
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Table 4: Swing seats or base? 
Sample is electorates won by the Coalition in 2001 
Panel A: Dependent variable is total funding per electorate ($m) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 R2R SF&C SR RP 
Coalition Voteshare 0.570** 0.000 -0.040* -0.004 
 [0.263] [0.000] [0.021] [0.041] 
Observations 83 83 83 83 
R-squared 0.08 0 0.01 0 
Panel B: Dependent variable is number of grants per electorate 
Coalition Voteshare  0.050 -0.095 0.150 
  [0.172] [0.062] [0.117] 
Observations  83 83 83 
R-squared  0 0.01 0.02 
Note: R2R=Roads to Recovery, SF&C=Stronger Families & Communities, SR=Sustainable Regions, 
RP=Regional Partnerships. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 5: Electoral swing and funding allocation  
Dependent variable: Swing to Coalition (percentage points) 
Panel A: Funding only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 R2R SF&C SR RP 
Funding ($m) 0.248*** 117.686*** 0.169 0.495 
 [0.040] [31.640] [0.136] [0.350] 
Observations 150 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.02 
Panel B: Controlling for relevant demographics 
Funding ($m) 0.370*** 113.009*** -0.051 0.09 
 [0.071] [36.682] [0.268] [0.284] 
Income  -26.282**   
  [11.274]   
Income2  12.291***   
  [4.664]   
Population Density -2.884**  4.245*** 4.020*** 
 [1.452]  [1.443] [1.473] 
Population Density2 0.215  -0.418*** -0.401** 
 [0.146]  [0.153] [0.156] 
Observations 150 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.21 0.13 0.07 0.07 
Panel C: Controlling for past voteshare 
Funding ($m) 0.058** 42.575** -0.092 -0.261 
 [0.025] [17.252] [0.219] [0.223] 
Coalition vote (2001) 0.820*** 0.798*** 0.832*** 0.849*** 
 [0.059] [0.070] [0.068] [0.061] 
Observations 150 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.71 0.67 0.66 0.66 
Panel D: Controlling for demographics and past voteshare 
Funding ($m) 0.132** 22.143 -0.114 -0.419 
 [0.055] [20.555] [0.232] [0.273] 
Income  3.401   
  [7.663]   
Income2  -2.99   
  [3.150]   
Population Density -1.909  0.634 1.229 
 [1.698]  [1.093] [1.091] 
Population Density2 0.158  -0.066 -0.11 
 [0.160]  [0.113] [0.109] 
Coalition vote (2001) 0.809*** 0.844*** 0.821*** 0.836*** 
 [0.059] [0.081] [0.068] [0.062] 
Observations 150 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.67 
Note: R2R=Roads to Recovery, SF&C=Stronger Families & Communities, SR=Sustainable Regions, 
RP=Regional Partnerships. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Population density is square kilometers per person. Income is 
median weekly family income ($000s). Coalition vote in 2001 is the election result in 2001, based on the 
2004 boundaries (see section 3.6 for details). 
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Table 6: Electoral swing and funding allocation  
Dependent variable: Swing to Coalition (percentage points) 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
R2R 0.250*** 0.343*** 0.087*** 0.090** 
 [0.044] [0.073] [0.026] [0.045] 
SF&C 51.937* 45.447 33.85 18.576 
 [30.930] [34.409] [21.940] [23.447] 
RP -0.453* -0.309 -0.580** -0.650** 
 [0.243] [0.228] [0.278] [0.324] 
SR -0.16 -0.106 -0.097 -0.084 
 [0.195] [0.183] [0.165] [0.139] 
Income  -19.869  3.504 
  [12.054]  [5.961] 
Income2  10.070**  -3.202 
  [4.929]  [2.481] 
Population Density  -2.310*  -0.944 
  [1.310]  [1.202] 
Population Density2  0.177  0.096 
  [0.125]  [0.110] 
Coalition vote (2001)   0.825*** 0.890*** 
   [0.055] [0.061] 
Observations 148 148 148 148 
R-squared 0.2 0.25 0.73 0.75 
Note: R2R=Roads to Recovery, SF&C=Stronger Families & Communities, SR=Sustainable Regions, 
RP=Regional Partnerships. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Population density is square kilometers per person. Income is 
median weekly family income ($000s). Coalition vote in 2001 is the election result in 2001, based on the 
2004 boundaries (see section 3.6 for details). 
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Table 7: Electoral swing and number of grants 
Dependent variable: Swing to Coalition (percentage points) 
Panel A: Number of grants only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SF&C SR RP 
Number of Grants 0.254*** 0.066 0.399*** 
 [0.071] [0.048] [0.100] 
Observations 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.11 0 0.12 
Panel B: Controlling for demographics  
Number of Grants 0.250*** -0.017 0.414*** 
 [0.080] [0.093] [0.091] 
Income -26.883**   
 [10.943]   
Income2 12.644***   
 [4.552]   
Population Density  4.249*** 1.617 
  [1.436] [1.617] 
Population Density2  -0.419*** -0.218 
  [0.151] [0.161] 
Observations 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.15 0.07 0.15 
Panel C: Controlling for past voteshare 
Number of Grants 0.099** -0.032 0.089** 
 [0.038] [0.085] [0.044] 
Coalition vote (2001) 0.794*** 0.833*** 0.802*** 
 [0.070] [0.068] [0.067] 
Observations 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.67 0.66 0.66 
Panel D: Controlling for demographics and past voteshare 
Number of Grants 0.058 -0.042 0.130* 
 [0.044] [0.089] [0.070] 
Income 3.449   
 [7.506]   
Income2 -2.942   
 [3.102]   
Population Density  0.656 -0.188 
  [1.079] [1.528] 
Population Density2  -0.07 -0.006 
  [0.111] [0.145] 
Coalition vote (2001) 0.838*** 0.821*** 0.796*** 
 [0.082] [0.068] [0.066] 
Observations 150 150 150 
R-squared 0.69 0.66 0.67 
Note: R2R=Roads to Recovery, SF&C=Stronger Families & Communities, SR=Sustainable Regions, 
RP=Regional Partnerships. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Population density is square kilometers per person. Income is 
median weekly family income ($000s). Coalition vote in 2001 is the election result in 2001, based on the 
2004 boundaries (see section 3.6 for details). 
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Data appendix 
Electorate Party (2001) 
Coalition 
Voteshare 
(2001) 
Swing 
(%) 
Persons 
per km2 
Mean 
weekly 
inc ($) 
R2R 
Funding 
($m) 
SF&C 
Funding 
($m) 
SF&C 
Projects 
(#) 
SR 
Funding 
($m) 
SR 
Projects 
(#) 
RP 
Funding 
($m) 
RP 
Programs 
(#) 
Adelaide (SA) LIB 50.22 -1.63 1769.8 1011 4.33 0.02 7 0.00 0 0.02 1 
Aston (Vic) LIB 56.17 10.15 1279.8 1180 2.37 0.01 9 0.00 0 0.01 1 
Ballarat (Vic) ALP 47.27 -0.63 13.7 793 11.54 0.02 12 0.00 0 1.03 7 
Banks (NSW) ALP 47.11 0.39 2245.7 1065 1.76 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Barker (SA) LIB 65.69 11.58 2.4 730 17.47 0.01 9 0.00 0 1.23 16 
Barton (NSW) ALP 43.98 -4.54 3207.3 1067 1.94 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Bass (Tas) ALP 47.94 3.68 12.4 760 7.76 0.02 9 0.00 0 0.71 5 
Batman (Vic) ALP 24.92 -8.77 2336.3 864 2.18 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Bendigo (Vic) ALP 46.43 0.84 12.1 736 13.38 0.03 17 0.00 0 0.52 5 
Bennelong (NSW) LIB 57.71 0.48 2412 1300 2.09 0.00 2 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Berowra (NSW) LIB 65.65 4.36 187.1 1488 2.22 0.01 5 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Blair (Qld) LIB 58.5 7.91 7.7 765 11.13 0.02 9 0.12 1 1.64 7 
Blaxland (NSW) ALP 34.79 -5.27 2427.3 839 2.07 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Bonner (Qld) ALP 49.05 1.46 632.25 1035.5 3.96       
Bonython (SA) ALP 39.58 6.65 531.4 718  0.01 7 0.00 0 0.03 1 
Boothby (SA) LIB 57.35 1.67 1007.5 1003 4.12 0.01 11 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Bowman (Qld) LIB 48.58 7.57 212.1 972 4.12 0.00 2 0.00 0 0.03 1 
Braddon (Tas) ALP 44.04 -9.47 7.8 688 8.88 0.01 3 0.18 5 0.07 1 
Bradfield (NSW) LIB 71.16 21.51 1321.1 1759 2.32 0.01 4 0.18 5 0.07 1 
Brand (WA) ALP 39.95 0.35 276.1 752 4.16 0.00 0 0.00 0 1.23 6 
Brisbane (Qld) ALP 46.87 -3.40 2074.1 1208 3.73 0.02 12 0.00 0 0.34 2 
Bruce (Vic) ALP 44.45 -0.23 1877.8 1003 2.47 0.01 3 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Burke (Vic) ALP 44.49 -0.25 41.5 993  0.03 15 0.00 0 0.08 2 
Calare (NSW) IND 51.73 -0.63 5.8 873 14.77 0.02 9 0.00 0 1.95 5 
Calwell (Vic) ALP 32.27 -0.59 482.2 964 3.09 0.01 3 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Canberra (ACT) ALP 40.56 -4.92 80.5 1347 10.00 0.03 12 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Canning (WA) LIB 50.38 9.34 27.8 915 6.64 0.01 4 0.00 0 3.60 5 
Capricornia (Qld) ALP 43.14 -2.39 0.5 886 16.19 0.03 19 0.00 0 4.33 10 
Casey (Vic) LIB 57.16 7.75 298.7 1058 4.70 0.00 5 0.00 0 0.02 1 
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Electorate Party (2001) 
Coalition 
Voteshare 
(2001) 
Swing 
(%) 
Persons 
per km2 
Mean 
weekly 
inc ($) 
R2R 
Funding 
($m) 
SF&C 
Funding 
($m) 
SF&C 
Projects 
(#) 
SR 
Funding 
($m) 
SR 
Projects 
(#) 
RP 
Funding 
($m) 
RP 
Programs 
(#) 
Charlton (NSW) ALP 43.34 -4.57 206.7 848 2.88 0.01 3 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Chifley (NSW) ALP 34.71 -5.33 1199.4 899 2.81 0.01 2 0.00 0 0.03 1 
Chisholm (Vic) ALP 47.23 -1.30 2102.7 1065 2.29 0.00 2 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Cook (NSW) LIB 64 6.82 712.1 1296 1.90 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Corangamite (Vic) LIB 55.67 2.62 15.3 894 10.94 0.04 25 0.00 0 0.33 1 
Corio (Vic) ALP 41.3 -1.39 150.5 825 5.51 0.04 21 0.00 0 0.17 3 
Cowan (WA) ALP 44.49 1.97 614.8 992 3.92 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.06 1 
Cowper (NSW) NP 54.73 4.10 15.6 618 7.96 0.02 8 0.00 0 0.88 9 
Cunningham (NSW) GRN 39.35 -0.81 291.3 1003 2.38 0.02 9 0.00 0 0.25 2 
Curtin (WA) LIB 63.91 7.67 1380.8 1381 3.35 0.01 2 0.00 0 0.20 1 
Dawson (Qld) NP 57.99 6.38 6.4 830 9.09 0.02 11 0.00 0 1.12 9 
Deakin (Vic) LIB 51.74 4.17 1947 1057 2.26 0.01 7 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Denison (Tas) ALP 35.74 -6.14 420.3 861 3.35 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.13 2 
Dickson (Qld) LIB 55.97 4.83 179.5 1071 4.08 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Dobell (NSW) LIB 50.38 5.70 137.2 877 3.14 0.01 6 0.00 0 1.64 4 
Dunkley (Vic) LIB 55.42 6.78 953.9 948 4.42 0.01 5 0.00 0 0.30 2 
Eden-Monaro (NSW) LIB 51.69 1.29 4.5 792 12.05 0.10 49 0.00 0 1.50 12 
Fadden (Qld) LIB 62.29 8.73 220.4 926 3.76 0.01 2 0.00 0 0.21 1 
Fairfax (Qld) LIB 59.21 6.23 33.2 677 4.27 0.01 3 0.00 0 0.92 4 
Farrer (NSW) LIB 66.37 11.62 1.3 816 29.85 0.04 26 0.00 0 1.61 12 
Fisher (Qld) LIB 62.06 7.08 231.9 700 4.81 0.01 6 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Flinders (Vic) LIB 57.62 7.41 61.9 828 8.56 0.04 17 0.00 0 0.02 1 
Forde (Qld) LIB 57.38 9.48 29.2 847 6.12 0.04 17 0.00 0 0.93 4 
Forrest (WA) LIB 57.61 6.65 5.7 845 15.40 0.05 23 0.00 0 2.57 16 
Fowler (NSW) ALP 28.51 -10.61 2855.7 714 2.45 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Franklin (Tas) ALP 41.96 -3.59 14.3 810 4.53 0.01 8 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Fraser (ACT) ALP 37.31 -6.98 350.8 1304 10.00 0.02 7 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Fremantle (WA) ALP 39.33 -2.41 588.9 937 3.33 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.19 3 
Gellibrand (Vic) ALP 28.22 -4.75 1690.6 860 2.24 0.01 5 0.00 0 0.08 1 
Gilmore (NSW) LIB 64.63 2.78 20.8 698 6.43 0.04 16 0.00 0 0.68 11 
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Electorate Party (2001) 
Coalition 
Voteshare 
(2001) 
Swing 
(%) 
Persons 
per km2 
Mean 
weekly 
inc ($) 
R2R 
Funding 
($m) 
SF&C 
Funding 
($m) 
SF&C 
Projects 
(#) 
SR 
Funding 
($m) 
SR 
Projects 
(#) 
RP 
Funding 
($m) 
RP 
Programs 
(#) 
Gippsland (Vic) NP 58.05 6.40 3.2 700 17.05 0.05 26 12.93 44 0.59 3 
Goldstein (Vic) LIB 59.48 5.28 2506.8 1385 2.15 0.00 3 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Gorton (Vic) ALP 40 -4.90 780.4 950 2.62       
Grayndler (NSW) ALP 28.71 -11.95 4465.7 1190 1.88 0.00 2 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Greenway (NSW) ALP 46.89 2.13 1145.8 1107 2.57 0.01 5 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Grey (SA) LIB 60.56 8.52 0.1 705 22.02 0.04 17 0.00 0 4.25 13 
Griffith (Qld) ALP 44.34 -5.53 1052.4 1099 4.04 0.01 6 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Groom (Qld) LIB 65.09 11.40 19.3 838 10.16 0.03 18 0.00 0 0.07 1 
Gwydir (NSW) NP 64.88 10.94 0.7 716 41.03 0.08 30 0.00 0 4.15 24 
Hasluck (WA) ALP 48.22 2.72 524.2 898 4.30 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.09 1 
Herbert (Qld) LIB 51.62 5.45 48.3 960 4.53 0.02 6 0.00 0 0.20 3 
Higgins (Vic) LIB 58.39 4.56 3183 1570 3.40 0.00 2 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Hindmarsh (SA) LIB 51.86 -0.56 1790.3 866 4.07 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.11 1 
Hinkler (Qld) NP 50.04 3.71 8 724 13.20 0.04 11 2.42 6 0.23 4 
Holt (Vic) ALP 36.68 2.44 1511 896 1.69 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Hotham (Vic) ALP 38.98 -1.90 1727.2 951 2.24 0.01 3 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Hughes (NSW) LIB 60.41 5.84 470.1 1397 2.17 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.01 1 
Hume (NSW) LIB 59.79 9.23 4.8 927 14.14 0.03 14 0.00 0 0.53 4 
Hunter (NSW) ALP 39.14 -8.30 11.6 874 7.41 0.02 10 0.00 0 0.26 1 
Indi (Vic) LIB 61.15 10.94 5.1 809 18.44 0.05 32 0.00 0 1.98 14 
Isaacs (Vic) ALP 47.19 1.82 613.8 981 2.50 0.01 6 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Jagajaga (Vic) ALP 44.36 -1.75 1565.7 1168 2.96 0.01 5 0.00 0 0.09 1 
Kingsford Smith (NSW) ALP 41.1 -4.56 2576.5 1146 1.85 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.10 1 
Kalgoorlie (WA) LIB 54.34 4.15 0.1 1072 48.87 0.04 12 9.81 19 5.93 33 
Kennedy (Qld) IND 58.95 0.00 0.3 790 28.68 0.02 9 10.48 31 7.44 10 
Kingston (SA) ALP 47.58 0.72 729.5 825 5.00 0.01 5 0.00 0 0.34 3 
Kooyong (Vic) LIB 60.94 4.35 2485.3 1593 2.06 0.00 2 0.00 0 0.03 1 
La Trobe (Vic) LIB 53.67 3.98 249.3 1089 4.27 0.03 17 0.00 0 0.21 2 
Lalor (Vic) ALP 34.37 -2.74 222 988 3.65 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.28 2 
Leichhardt (Qld) LIB 56.39 6.80 1.1 883 9.25 0.03 13 0.58 3 0.90 6 
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Electorate Party (2001) 
Coalition 
Voteshare 
(2001) 
Swing 
(%) 
Persons 
per km2 
Mean 
weekly 
inc ($) 
R2R 
Funding 
($m) 
SF&C 
Funding 
($m) 
SF&C 
Projects 
(#) 
SR 
Funding 
($m) 
SR 
Projects 
(#) 
RP 
Funding 
($m) 
RP 
Programs 
(#) 
Lilley (Qld) ALP 45.17 -2.97 884.9 958 4.17 0.01 7 0.00 0 0.06 1 
Lindsay (NSW) LIB 55.47 2.51 358.8 1132 2.78 0.00 2 0.00 0 0.07 1 
Lingiari (NT) ALP 44.71 -5.01 0.1 856 10.00 0.01 5 0.00 0 5.47 8 
Longman (Qld) LIB 52.72 6.41 64.6 720 4.36 0.04 19 0.00 0 0.73 2 
Lowe (NSW) ALP 46.19 -1.40 3150.7 1270 1.98 0.01 6 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Lyne (NSW) NP 61.24 7.43 13.4 642 9.94 0.02 13 0.00 0 3.21 9 
Lyons (Tas) ALP 41.83 0.42 2.1 685 15.07 0.02 8 0.60 3 0.50 7 
Melbourne Ports (Vic) ALP 44.31 -0.89 3038.5 1406 1.88 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Macarthur (NSW) LIB 56.96 6.01 223.3 1088 2.70 0.01 3 7.95 12 0.00 0 
Mackellar (NSW) LIB 66.87 7.30 575.4 1416 2.21 0.02 5 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Macquarie (NSW) LIB 58.67 4.57 30.5 1077 5.11 0.03 17 0.00 0 0.08 1 
Makin (SA) LIB 53.76 -0.92 1137.2 930 3.96 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.19 1 
Mallee (Vic) NP 69.93 14.30 1.7 755 25.26 0.03 16 0.00 0 0.45 11 
Maranoa (Qld) NP 66.01 13.23 0.2 797 59.64 0.03 15 0.00 0 1.80 12 
Maribyrnong (Vic) ALP 32.62 -1.77 1817.5 893 2.31 0.01 5 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Mayo (SA) LIB 62.87 6.44 59.7 1000 7.24 0.01 3 0.00 0 0.38 3 
McEwen (Vic) LIB 51.2 5.27 9.6 945 11.07 0.02 13 0.00 0 1.40 10 
McMillan (Vic) LIB 47.54 3.59 20.2 817 14.00 0.02 14 0.00 0 0.12 2 
McPherson (Qld) LIB 62.55 7.79 358.7 789 3.28 0.01 3 0.00 0 0.46 4 
Melbourne (Vic) ALP 29.91 -11.19 3040.8 1154 2.43 0.02 11 0.00 0 0.33 3 
Menzies (Vic) LIB 58.94 6.22 969.6 1241 2.58 0.01 3 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Mitchell (NSW) LIB 71.32 10.03 683.5 1597 2.52 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Moncrieff (Qld) LIB 65.42 11.99 915.7 845 4.51 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.06 1 
Moore (WA) LIB 56.04 7.83 1427.9 1131 2.62 0.00 3 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Moreton (Qld) LIB 54.21 2.87 1193.9 1011 4.10 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.12 2 
Murray (Vic) LIB 73.93 13.13 7.6 813 19.43 0.04 21 0.00 0 1.51 8 
New England (NSW) IND 63.85 -0.64 2.3 741 23.01 0.01 7 0.00 0 5.79 11 
Newcastle (NSW) ALP 43.09 -6.53 733.8 836 2.70 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.10 3 
North Sydney (NSW) LIB 63.22 3.43 3476 1792 2.08 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 
O'Connor (WA) LIB 69.09 10.84 0.7 723 56.42 0.04 17 0.00 0 7.12 22 
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Coalition 
Voteshare 
(2001) 
Swing 
(%) 
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inc ($) 
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(#) 
Oxley (Qld) ALP 41.86 -5.72 201.5 839 5.16 0.01 5 0.00 0 0.08 1 
Page (NSW) NP 52.77 2.83 7.3 656 12.26 0.03 13 3.77 12 0.43 8 
Parkes (NSW) NP 58.74 10.05 0.5 757 34.91 0.03 14 0.00 0 1.39 6 
Parramatta (NSW) LIB 51.15 -1.37 2351.4 1080 2.47 0.01 6 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Paterson (NSW) LIB 51.42 6.27 12.3 711 7.51 0.05 23 0.00 0 0.75 7 
Pearce (WA) LIB 56.88 9.49 4.6 885 15.38 0.03 13 0.00 0 1.67 3 
Perth (WA) ALP 38.79 -1.13 1701.1 909 4.19 0.02 10 0.00 0 0.20 2 
Petrie (Qld) LIB 53.42 6.17 853 912 3.79 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.43 4 
Port Adelaide (SA) ALP 35.35 -4.91 500.5 760 4.48 0.00 2 0.43 1 0.04 1 
Prospect (NSW) ALP 37.19 -0.72 914.6 1019 2.52 0.01 2 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Rankin (Qld) ALP 43.32 -2.03 948 853 4.82 0.01 2 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Reid (NSW) ALP 33.13 -4.32 2103.7 827 2.20 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Richmond (NSW) NP 51.68 -1.04 57.2 654 6.72 0.02 9 2.92 16 12.14 6 
Riverina (NSW) NP 69.87 10.71 2.9 866 23.24 0.02 9 0.00 0 0.41 4 
Robertson (NSW) LIB 56.98 3.31 168 908 3.04 0.02 8 0.00 0 0.41 5 
Ryan (Qld) LIB 58.62 5.62 530.9 1305 4.02 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Scullin (Vic) ALP 30.81 -4.69 1489.3 970 2.75 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.10 1 
Shortland (NSW) ALP 41.22 -5.09 625 767 3.01 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Solomon (NT) CLP 50.09 2.76 315.2 1182 10.00 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.80 3 
Stirling (WA) ALP 48.42 2.84 1573.1 888 2.95 0.01 2 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Sturt (SA) LIB 58.18 2.55 1755.1 983 4.02 0.01 4 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Swan (WA) ALP 47.96 0.92 1110.2 890 3.44 0.02 7 0.00 0 0.11 1 
Sydney (NSW) ALP 34.96 -8.92 3694.8 1517 2.01 0.01 5 0.00 0 0.13 2 
Tangney (WA) LIB 57.97 7.75 1721.5 1127 3.35 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Throsby (NSW) ALP 34.9 -7.45 283.1 859 2.47 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.39 2 
Wakefield (SA) ALP 64.56 1.32 4.8 774 7.61 0.02 10 3.90 7 0.66 8 
Wannon (Vic) LIB 59.61 7.77 3.8 780 26.80 0.03 20 0.00 0 0.86 6 
Warringah (NSW) LIB 62.66 4.13 2297 1572 2.01 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Watson (NSW) ALP 32.69 -6.49 3907.7 887 1.89 0.00 2 0.00 0 0.00 0 
Wentworth (NSW) LIB 57.86 1.53 4971 1649 1.72 0.01 7 0.00 0 0.22 1 
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Coalition 
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(%) 
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inc ($) 
R2R 
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($m) 
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($m) 
SF&C 
Projects 
(#) 
SR 
Funding 
($m) 
SR 
Projects 
(#) 
RP 
Funding 
($m) 
RP 
Programs 
(#) 
Werriwa (NSW) ALP 41.51 -5.06 839 1031 2.60 0.00 2 2.56 2 0.12 1 
Wide Bay (Qld) NP 60.73 7.94 2.3 622 10.01 0.04 17 5.33 14 0.51 2 
Wills (Vic) ALP 30.58 -6.60 2421.9 917 2.36 0.01 6 0.00 0 0.17 1 
Note: R2R=Roads to Recovery, SF&C=Stronger Families & Communities, SR=Sustainable Regions, RP=Regional Partnerships. 
ALP=Australian Labor Party, CLP=Country Liberal Party, GRN=Green Party, IND=Independent, LIB=Liberal Party of Australia, NP=National Party of 
Australia. 
